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ABSTRACT 
The focal point of the revealed preference (RP) valuation literature, including recreation 
demand and random utility maximization (RUM) models, has been on eliciting the “use” value 
associated with environmental amenities; i.e., that portion of value associated with direct use of a 
resource. Mäler’s (1974) concept of weak complementarity is typically invoked to justify this 
focus. Indeed, weak complementarity explicitly or implicitly underlies most of the RP literature. 
In this paper, we consider the measurement of welfare in RP models when weak 
complementarity does not hold. In particular, the Kuhn-Tucker (KT) framework (e.g., Phaneuf et 
al. 2000) does not impose weak complementarity a priori, raising the possibility of rejecting 
weakly complementary in estimation and the question as to what is the proper welfare measure 
to report. Although existence value cannot be measured, we argue that in some circumstances 
there are components of total value outside of use value onto which RP methods may be able to 
shed light. 
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WHAT’S THE USE? 
WELFARE ESTIMATES FROM REVEALED PREFERENCE MODELS 
WHEN WEAK COMPLEMENTARITY DOES NOT HOLD 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A large literature on the valuation of environmental quality changes based upon behavioral 
data on use of the environment has developed over the past 30 years. These models have been 
variously referred to as recreation demand, travel cost, and/or revealed preference (RP) models 
and have employed a variety of demand and/or random utility estimation techniques. The 
purpose of these models has been, almost without exception, to estimate the value of the direct 
use of these resources. Thus, the surplus measures estimated have often been referred to as “use” 
values. 
Mäler's (1974) concept of weak complementarity has typically been invoked to justify the 
focus on use values explicitly or implicitly underlying most of the revealed preference literature. 
In brief, the property of weak complementarity implies that if an individual does not directly use 
an environmental good, he or she places no value on changes in the quality attributes of that 
good. Hence, there is no value associated with environmental quality except that which accrues 
from using the good. Most discussions of weak complementarity begin and end with comments 
along these lines. Thus, although numerous RP models invoke weak complementarity, few 
papers give serious attention to empirical specification of RP models or their interpretation in its 
absence. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the measurement of welfare from RP models in 
which weak complementarity may not hold. Specifically, the Kuhn-Tucker (KT) framework of 
Wales and Woodland (1983) has recently been applied (e.g., Phaneuf and Herriges 1999; 
Phaneuf et al. 2000) in modeling recreation demand, yet within this framework the analyst need 
not impose a priori weak complementarity in the functional form for preferences. This raises 
both the possibility of rejecting the weak complementarity assumption in estimation and the 
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question as to what components of value are revealed by the non-weakly complementary model. 
It is important that we note at the outset that pure “existence value” (as we will define it later) 
simply cannot be estimated from RP data. This well-understood point is not in contention here. 
Rather, we are simply interested in what complications arise to computing welfare estimates 
from RP models in the absence of weak complementarity. For example, if weak complementarity 
does not hold, what is the appropriate interpretation of the traditionally computed welfare 
measures (i.e., areas under the estimated demand curve)? Does the lack of weak complementarity 
bias the estimate of this value? What interpretation might the analyst give to the residual value 
that is present even when demand is zero? Should the welfare analyst impose weak 
complementarity for estimation purposes even when he or she suspects its absence? 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. We begin in Section 2 by 
developing a formal decomposition of total value based upon Hanemann (1988), emphasizing 
those components of value that are exposed by revealed preference data when the weak 
complementarity does not hold. Section 3 then outlines the KT modeling framework. We 
describe the model with and without weak complementarity and the range of competing welfare 
measures that one can compute when weak complementarity is not imposed. The choice among 
these welfare measures depends in large part upon the perceived source of the violation of weak 
complementarity. Thus, in Section 4 we explore three competing rationales for observing 
violations of weak complementarity and their respective implications for welfare analysis. These 
issues are then explored empirically in Section 5 using data from a survey on wetland usage in 
the state of Iowa. Six thousand residents were sampled in the spring of 1998, providing data on 
the number of visits they took to wetland areas in the state and the costs of those visits. Using an 
estimated KT model, we compare and contrast competing measures of the welfare improvements 
resulting from increased pheasant populations in the state. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Components of Value Exposed 
by Revealed Preference Data 
 
A number of authors have decomposed total value into use value and existence value 
associated with changes in environmental quality relying upon weak complementarity to define 
the two pieces (Madariaga and McConnell [1987]; Freeman [1993] identifies three components 
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of value: use value, pure existence value (value placed on environmental quality completely 
independent of use), and nonuse value (value the individual gets that is related to use, but which 
does not disappear when the good is not consumed). Hanemann (1988) defines nonuse and use 
value but employs a definition that does not invoke weak complementarity to distinguish the 
two. In this paper, we adopt and modify slightly the approach suggested by Hanemann (1988). 
The main purpose for the decomposition is to aid our understanding of the inherent limitations 
on the empirical welfare measures that can be extracted from RP data. 
The decomposition process begins by specifying a general structure of consumer preferences 
that will accommodate both traditional use value and the more controversial indirect use and 
existence value components. Hanemann (1988) assumes that the direct utility function takes the 
form 
 ( ), ,U T u q q =  x  (1) 
where x is a vector of private market goods and q (a scalar) is a public good (e.g., environmental 
amenity) taken as given by the individual consumer; [ ],T u q  is increasing in u and q; and ( ),u qx  
is increasing and quasi-concave in x and q. Note that q enters utility in two separate places, in a 
group with the private goods (x) and separably on its own. Importantly, the marginal rates of 
substitution between observed consumption bundles (the x’s) will be independent of the second 
component of the utility function and thus cannot reveal information about the value of changes 
in that portion of the function.1 
The corresponding indirect utility function is then given by: 
 
( ) ( ){ }
( ){ }
( )
, , , ,
, ,
, , ,
V q y Max T u q q y
T Max u q y q
T v q y q
′ ≡ ≤ 
 ′= ≤ 
 =  
x
x
p x p x
x p x
p
 (2) 
where ( ) ( ){ }, , ,v q y Max u q y′≡ ≤
x
p x p x . Again, as the second line of equation (2) emphasizes, all 
of the interactions between the consumer’s activity in the marketplace (including recreational 
demand) and the public good q are revealed through ( ), ,v q yp  and independent of the form of 
( ),T q⋅ . Consequently, RP data simply cannot be used to estimate the form of ( ),T q⋅ . 
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Finally, we can specify the corresponding expenditure function as: 
 
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
( )
, , , ,
, ,
, , ,
E q U Min T u q q U
Min u q u U q
e q u U q
′  ≡ ≥ 
′= ≥
 =  
x
x
p p x x
p x x
p
! !
!!
!!
 (3) 
where ( ),u U q!!  is defined implicitly by [ ],T u q U= !!  and ( ) ( ){ }, , ,e q u Min u q u′≡ ≥
x
p p x x! !  denotes the 
standard expenditure function.2 Note that the utility level at which the traditional expenditure 
function is evaluated is adjusted for the second role of q in preferences and that generally 
( ) ( ), , , ,E q u e q u≠p p! ! . 
Turning to welfare valuations, it is natural to define the total compensating variation ( TC ) 
for a change in the level of the resource from 0q  to 1q  as  
 ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 1 1, , , , , , .TT v q y q T v q y C q   = −   p p  (4) 
Hanemann (1988) suggests the following decomposition: 
 T RC C C= + !  (5) 
where RC  is implicitly defined by 
 ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 1 0, , , , , ,RT v q y q T v q y C q   = −   p p  (6) 
and C!  satisfies 
 ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 1, , , , , ,T v q y q T v q y C q   = −   p p ! . (7) 
Notice that RC  compensates for the impact that the change in q has on the first argument in 
( ),T ⋅ ⋅ , whereas C!  compensates for the impact of the change on the second argument of ( ),T ⋅ ⋅ . 
Unfortunately, the decomposition in equation (5) holds only if the marginal utility of income is 
constant.3 However, the following modified version of equation (5) can be used: 
 T R EC C C= +  (8) 
where EC  is implicitly defined by 
 ( ) ( )0 1 0 0 1 1, , , , , ,R R ET v q y q T v q y C q   = −   p p  (9) 
and R Ry y C≡ − . Comparing equations (4), (6), and (9), it is clear that what we have is a 
sequential compensation for the change in q , with: 
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( ) ( )
( )
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1
, , , , , ,
, , , .
R
R E
T v q y q T v q y C q
T v q y C C q
   = −   
 = − − 
p p
p
 (10) 
The compensation RC  in the first line of equation (10) is used to offset the impact that the 
change in q has on ( ), ,v q yp . In contrast, EC  denotes the additional compensation required to 
make the individual whole; i.e., compensating for the impact that the change in q has on the 
second argument in ( ),T q⋅  given RC  has already been paid.4 Throughout the remainder of the 
paper, we refer to RC  as the revealable portion of compensation and EC  as existence value.5 
Note that this definition of existence value makes no use of the property of weak 
complementarity (as others have often done in the definition of existence value). It is worth 
reemphasizing one final time that this piece of value cannot be recovered from RP data. This 
inherent limitation of RP is well known and will receive no further attention here.6 
Rather, our focus will turn to the remaining piece, which we have termed RC . This piece is 
of particular interest because it describes the portion of preferences about which we can 
potentially infer something from RP data. The next question is how much of RC  can be inferred 
from RP data. This is where Mäler's (1974) concept of weak complementarity becomes helpful. 
We note that RC  can itself be decomposed into pieces as follows: 
 R U IUC C C= +  (11) 
with IUC  implicitly defined by 
 ( ) ( )0 0 1 1, , , , IUv q q y v q q y C   = −   p p! ! , (12) 
where ( )qp!  denotes the price vector at which x = 0  and U R IUC C C≡ − . It seems intuitive to refer 
to IUC  as the “indirect use” value, as it represents welfare changes when the associated market 
goods are not in use, whereas UC  corresponds to direct “use” value.7 The components UC  and 
IUC  can be equivalently defined in terms of the expenditure function as:8 
 ( ){ } ( ){ }0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0, , , , , , , ,UC e q u e q q u e q u e q q u      = − − −      p p p p! !  (13) 
and 
 ( ) ( )0 0 0 1 1 0, , , ,IUC e q q u e q q u   = −   p p! !  (14) 
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where ( )0 0, ,u v q y= p . Mäler's (1974) assumption of weak complementarity recognizes that if  
 ( ) ( )0 0 1 1, , , ,v q q y v q q y   =   p p! !  (15) 
then 0IUC =  and U RC C= , capturing all of the revealable value resulting from a change in q. 
Further, UC  can be represented as areas under Hicksian demands 
 ( ) ( )
1 0
1 1
0 0
1 1
( ) ( )
1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1, , , , , , ,
p q p q
U
p p
C x p q u dp x p q u dp
− −
= −∫ ∫p p
! !
 (16) 
where 1−p  represents the vector of all prices except for good 1 and ( )1 01 1 1, , ,x p q u−p  denotes the 
Hicksian demand for good 1 . This is a very handy result for applied welfare analysts as it means 
that once a demand function is estimated, the welfare change associated with a change in quality 
can be computed via McConnell (1983).9 There is no need to explicitly specify the underlying 
expenditure or indirect utility functions. 
As noted previously, the environmental literature has relied almost exclusively upon the 
assumption of weak complementarity to justify, explicitly or implicitly, welfare valuations 
extracted from RPs. Indeed, weak complementarity is implicit in the standard random utility 
maximization (or RUM) model used extensively in the recreation demand literature. This 
widespread use of the RUM model begs the question as to whether weak complementarity 
accurately reflects consumer preferences and whether its imposition biases the implied welfare 
calculations. In contrast, the KT model provides a utility theoretic framework allowing a more 
general representation of preferences, within which weak complementarity need not be assumed 
a priori. At the same time, however, it raises that practical issue as to what the appropriate 
welfare measure should be. In the next section, we outline the KT framework both in terms of 
the required estimation procedure and the calculation of RC , UC , and IUC . 
 
3. The Kuhn-Tucker Framework 
The KT model adopts a top-down specification for preferences, beginning with 
maximization of the consumer’s direct utility function subject to income and nonnegativity 
constraints. The first-order conditions, given the potential for nonconsumption of a subset of the 
goods, take the form of the KT conditions. Formally the consumer solves the problem 
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,
( , , , , )
z
Max u z γ ε
x
x q  (17) 
subject to 
 ' z y+ ≤p x  (18) 
and 
 0, 0, 1, ,jz x j M≥ ≥ = …  (19) 
where ( )u ⋅  is assumed to be a quasi-concave, increasing, and continuously differentiable function 
of ( ), zx , 1( , , )Mx x ′=x …  is a vector of goods to be analyzed (recreation trips), z is the numeraire 
good, 1( , , )Mp p ′=p …  is a vector of commodity prices (travel costs), 1( , , )Mq q ′=q …  is a vector of 
site-specific quality attributes, y denotes annual income, γ  is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and 1( , , )Mε ε ′ε = …  is a vector of random disturbances capturing the variation in 
preferences in the population. Note that a priori, the top-level specification of utility need not in 
general exhibit the property of weak complementarity. 
Assuming the numeraire good is necessary, the first-order conditions for this problem are 
given by 
 ; 0; 0, 1,..., .j j z j j j j zu p u x x u p u j M ≤ ≥ − = =   (20) 
Given assumptions on the structure of the utility function, the KT conditions can be rewritten as  
 ( , , , ); 0; ( , , , ) 0, 1,..., ,j j j j j jg y x x g y j Mε γ ε γ ≤ ≥ − = = x q x q  (21) 
where ( )jg ⋅  is a function of observed variables and parameters to be estimated, determined by 
the choice of functional form for utility. Equation (21) provides the basis for forming estimating 
equations for the model. Given a distribution for the error terms, the probability of observing 
each individual’s outcome in the data can be determined from equation (21) and maximum 
likelihood used to recover estimates of the parameters.10 
Because of the nonnegativity constraints, the demand system, and hence the indirect utility 
function of interest for welfare analysis, is nondifferentiable. For example, if there are M  sites 
available, there are 2M  different combinations of sites that can be visited, including the 
possibility of not visiting any of the sites during the season. Therefore there are an equal number 
of potential demand systems, conditional on the demand regime. Let  
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 { } { } { } { } { } { }{ }, 1 , 2 ,..., , 1,2 ,..., 1, ,..., 1,2,...M M MΩ = ∅  (22) 
denote the collection of all possible demand patterns and ( , , , , )v yω γ εp q  denote the indirect utility 
function when the individual is restricted to the commodities indexed by ω∈Ω . Note the 
maximization process implies the conditional indirect utility function is a function of only the 
prices of consumed goods, whereas the absence of weak complementarity implies the conditional 
indirect utility function may in fact be a function of all quality attributes, regardless if they are 
consumed. The individual’s unconditional indirect utility function is then given by  
 ( ) ( ){ }, , , , max , , , ,v y v yω ω
ω
γ ε γ ε
∈Ω
=p q p q .  (23) 
This corresponds to the indirect utility function, ( ), ,v yp q , which is in fact the separable 
component of the overall utility function given in equation (2). As noted above, RP methods can 
at best expose information on resource values given by RC . In the particular case of the KT 
model, this is implicitly defined by  
 ( ){ } ( ){ }0 10 1max , , , , max , , , ,Rv y v y Cω ω ω ωω ωγ ε γ ε∈Ω ∈Ω= −p q p q  (24) 
and may, if preferences are not weakly complementary, include indirect use value. Direct use 
value, or UC  as defined in equation (13), is given by U R IUC C C= − , where IUC  is implicitly 
defined by 
 ( ){ } ( ){ }0 10 1max , , , , max , , , ,IUv y v y Cω ω ω ωω ωγ ε γ ε∈Ω ∈Ω= −p q p q! ! , (25) 
where ωp!  is the vector of choke prices for each of the demand regimes. Preferences in equation 
(17) are characterized via estimation up to an unobserved vector of error terms, and no closed 
form for the compensating surpluses given by equations (24) and (25) exists. Given an estimated 
distribution for the error term, however, Monte Carlo integration can be used to obtain estimates 
of the expected value of the surplus measures.11 
Having described the top-down approach of the KT model, we pause momentarily to 
mention a second, fundamentally different approach to recovering estimates of consumer 
preferences based on a bottom-up approach suggested by Hausman (1981). This strategy begins 
with the specification and estimation of ordinary demand equations, from which the quasi 
expenditure and indirect utility functions can be recovered via integration up to a constant of 
integration. For purposes of welfare measurement over price changes, the quasi expenditure 
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function is sufficient to calculate compensating variation. Welfare measures of quality changes 
are problematic, however, because the constant of integration will in general depend on quality 
measures. Larson (1991) suggests solving this by introducing additional information into the 
integration problem: namely, the weak complementarity condition on the expenditure function 
stating that the change in expenditure for a change in quality, when evaluated at the choke price, 
must be zero. With this additional condition, Larson (1991) shows it is possible to recover a 
quasi-indirect and weakly complementary utility function up to a constant of integration from 
estimates of any system of ordinary demand equations, from which the use-value welfare effects 
of quality changes can be evaluated. Larson’s (1991) suggestion provides the economist with a 
useful tool for estimating weakly complementary preferences if it is thought that this is a 
reasonable restriction on preferences. However, it does not provide guidance as to whether or not 
weak complementarity should be imposed a priori and, if not, what is the proper welfare 
measure? Furthermore, recovering a characterization of preferences via the bottom-up approach 
is much more difficult in the presence of corner solutions, because regime-specific, quasi-
indirect utility functions must be recovered from the demand system specification. More 
importantly, information as contained in equation (20) is typically not available for the 
construction of utility-theoretic, endogenous-regime-switching conditions. In the presence of 
binding nonnegativity constraints it is therefore likely that the top-down approach of the KT 
model has a significant comparative advantage.  
Returning, then, to discussion of the KT model, its estimation requires specification of the 
functional form for utility and distribution of the error terms. Given the complexities of 
estimation and welfare calculations, currently only relatively simple functional forms have been 
used.12 In the application that follows we assume utility is given by a version of the LES utility 
function such that 
 
1
( , ; , , ) ( , ) ln( ) ln( )
M
j j j j j
j
u z q x zε θ
=
= Ψ + +∑x q γ ε  (26) 
where ( ),δ θγ = , jΨ  is a quality index given by 0 1( , ) exp( )j j j j jq qε δ δ εΨ = + + , and jq  is a site 
quality variable. This choice allows straightforward derivations of the estimating equations given 
in equation (21) and provides for tractable welfare calculations. There is a large literature 
concerned with the linear expenditure system with much of it focusing on the interpretation that 
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is given to the jθ  parameters. The original demand work employing the LES utility function 
interpreted jθ−  as a “subsistence quantity” for which no utility is obtained. Given subsistence 
expenditures, “supernumerary income” is then allocated among the available goods. This 
interpretation requires that 0jθ < , which in turn implies strong and unreasonable restrictions on 
the price and income elasticities that can be recovered from the model (see, e.g., King 1979). 
However, more recent literature concerning the LES (e.g. Green and Hassan 1980; Pollak and 
Wales 1992) has demonstrated that the 'j sθ  need not be restricted in sign in order to provide a 
consistent representation of preferences. Furthermore, additional flexibility in elasticity values is 
possible when the signs of these parameters are allowed to be positive. 
This is important for our purposes in that in the presence of corner solutions the utility 
function is only defined for 0jθ > . Furthermore, as Larson (1991, p. 103) notes, preferences 
exhibit weak complementarity between jx  and jq  for the special case of 1jθ = , whereas for 
1jθ ≠  weak complementarity does not hold. Thus, given this specification of utility, estimation 
may lead to a recovery of preferences for which weak complementarity does not hold, implying 
the computation of RC  from equation (16) will not be equal to UC . The analyst is then faced 
with a decision on the proper welfare measure to report. In the following section we discuss 
several explanations for why weak complementarity may fail to hold and ramifications for which 
welfare measure should be reported. 
 
4. Rationale for Observing Violations of Weak Complementarity 
We suggest three possible explanations for the estimation of non-weakly complementary 
preferences. First, there may be one or more goods that form the set of goods that are weakly 
complementary to q. Madariaga and McConnell (1987) consider this possibility when they note 
that their definition of existence value includes off-site use values. Bockstael and Kling (1988) 
derive the appropriate welfare measures if all of the weakly complementary demands are 
estimated and used for welfare computation. If the analyst has included only one of the goods in 
the empirical model, the omitted variables may show up as a rejection of weak complementarity. 
Second, the absence of weak complementarity may be a direct result of the individual's 
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preference for environmental quality. For example, in the context of the household production 
framework, environmental quality may be an essential good in the production of environmental 
services, whereas x  may not be (see, e.g., Bockstael and McConnell 1983). Third and finally, 
estimation of preferences that appear inconsistent with weak complementarity may stem from 
econometric problems such as model specification and/or measurement errors. In this section, we 
discuss each of these explanations in turn. We consider their implications for specifying 
empirical models of RPs as well as the appropriate computation and interpretation of welfare 
measures coming from such models. 
 
Weak Complementarity with Sets of Goods—An Omitted Variables Story 
Bockstael and Kling (1988) derive welfare measures for changes in environmental quality 
when quality is weakly complementary to a set of goods. Suppose there are two goods that are 
weak complements to q, 1x  and 2x . This means that when both 1x  and 2x  equal zero, the 
marginal utility of q also is zero. Bockstael and Kling (1988) demonstrate that in this case, the 
correct welfare measure for a change in q can be written as the sum of areas under demand 
curves13 
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In terms of expenditure functions, RC  can be expressed equivalently as 
 ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 0 1 01 2 1 2, , , , , ,
R UC C
e p p q u e p p q u
=
= −
 (30) 
Our point of departure is to consider what happens when the analyst either does not know or 
cannot measure 2x  and thus cannot estimate the second demand function. Further, the analyst 
cannot include the price of 2x  in the estimating equation for 1x , possibly generating biased 
coefficient estimates for the first demand equation, depending of course on the correlation 
patterns between the omitted variable and the included ones. 
What are the implications of this misspecification for welfare measurement? Obviously, the 
analyst cannot estimate the sum of areas as represented in equation (27) because 2x  is unknown. 
However, the analyst might be able to recover an unbiased estimate of 1UC  in equation (28). Further, 
the analyst might be able to use knowledge of the form of the expenditure function underlying the 
estimated demand model to compute some part of RC . We are interested in identifying the 
circumstances under which 1UC  and/or RC  might be recovered from RP estimates. As suggested 
earlier, the answer depends on the correlation patterns between the omitted and included variables. 
Suppose first that the omitted price of good 2 is not correlated with any of the other independent 
variables in the first demand equation. If 2x  represents magazines, books, videos, and/or other 
nonconsumption items related to q, the assumption of complete independence may be quite 
reasonable (in fact, 2p  might be nearly constant across the sample). For intuition in considering the 
econometric implications, suppose the true demands for both goods are linear; i.e., 
 1,2;i i i i i j ix p p q i j iα β γ δ= + + + = ≠ . (31) 
Standard omitted variables results indicate that the estimation of the demand for 1x  in this 
circumstance will result in unbiased coefficient estimates for each of the slope parameters, but a 
biased constant term with 
 01 1 2 2( )E pα α β= +  (32) 
where 02p is the sample average price of 2x . The sign of the bias to the intercept will depend upon the 
relationship between 1x  and 2x : if they are substitutes, the constant term will be biased upwards; if 
they are complements, the bias will be downwards. 
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What are the implications for welfare measurement? Because each individual's 2p  is 
unknown and cannot be included in the estimating equation, the demand equation is conditioned 
on the sample average 02p  rather than the individual's actual 2p . The estimated welfare for each 
individual can be expressed as 
 ( ) ( )
1 0
1 1
0 0
1 1
( ) ( )
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, (33) 
yielding a bias of 
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 (34) 
Unfortunately, the sign of this bias is generally indeterminate both for any individual and when 
summed over the sample.14 However, two conditions under which this bias will be small are 
clear:  
(1) when 2p  does not vary across the sample then 0 02 2p p=  and there is no bias, and  
(2)  when 1 2/x p∂ ∂ = 0 or is small, the bias also will be nonexistent or small. 
We now turn to the prospects in this case for the estimation of RC . Recall that RC  can be 
written as in equation (30) as the difference between two expenditure functions. Are these 
recoverable? The answer is yes, but like the recovery of 1UC , they can only be evaluated at the 
“wrong” value of 2p . To see why, note that if we know the Hicksian demand (as required to 
compute 1UC ), we can integrate it over price to recover the expenditure function. Like the 
demand, the expenditure function will be a function of the own price ( 1p ), q, and the sample 
average of the price of the second good ( 02p ) (embedded in the parameter estimates). Thus, 
computation of the difference in expenditure functions evaluated at the current own price and 
changes in q is equivalent to 
( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 0 1 01 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ
, , , , , ,
R UC C
e p p q u e p p q u
=
= −
 (35) 
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yielding a bias of 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 01 2 1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , , , , , , , , ,Rbias e p p q u e p p q u e p p q u e p p q u   = − − −     (36) 
Unfortunately, the sign and magnitude of this bias is again indeterminate. Under very restrictive 
conditions one might be able to estimate the correct structure for the expenditure function and obtain 
unbiased estimates of UC .15 However, these conditions are unlikely to hold in practice and we would 
recommend instead that 1ˆUC  be computed and reported as what it is, a measure of the use value 
stemming from the combined use of 1x  and q, and acknowledging the missing components 2UC!  and 
EC . 
Now consider the case where the omitted price of good 2 is perfectly correlated with one of 
the variables in the 2x  equation. A likely candidate would seem to be 1p . In particular, if 1x  
represents visits to a recreation site for the purpose of fishing and 2x  represents visits to the same 
site with the purpose of swimming, hiking, or any other activity, the perfect correlation of prices 
is quite likely. Following Bockstael and Kling (1988), suppose the prices of the two commodities 
are related in a linear fashion, so that 
 2 1 2 1p pφ φ= + , (37) 
where 1φ  and 2φ  are constants. In this case, estimation of the linear model in (31) omitting 2p  
will yield the following properties of the estimated coefficients 
 1 1 2 1ˆ( )E α α β φ= +  (38) 
and 
 1 1 2 2ˆ( )E β β β φ= + . (39) 
In this case, the relationship between 1p  and 2p  is embedded in the estimated demand function 
for 1x  since the estimated coefficients incorporate the relationship. What does this mean for the 
recovery of 1UC  and R UC C= ? As Bockstael and Kling [1988, p. 660] note in a similar situation, 
by varying 1p , we are implicitly varying 2p  as well. Thus, when constructing 1UC  using equation 
(28), one is in fact computing 
 ( ) ( )1 0 0 01 1 1 2 1 1 2, , , - , , ,U P PC x p p q u dt x p p q u dt= ∫ ∫#  (40) 
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where the price path P  corresponds to 1p t=  and 2 1 2p tφ φ= + . The remaining component of 
R UC C=  corresponds to  
 ( ) ( )
2 1
1 0 0 0
2 1 2 2 1 2, , , - , , , .
U U U
P P
C C C
x p p q u dt x p p q u dt
= −
= ∫ ∫
# #
 (41) 
Again, without strong structural assumptions regarding the nature of preferences, the analyst is 
unlikely to have an estimate of the functional form for 2x , which in turn precludes the 
computation of 2UC
#
, leaving the 1UC
#
 as that portion of RC  that is recoverable. 
 
Environmental Quality as an Essential Good—A Household Production Story 
An alternative explanation for violations of weak complementarity arises from the 
household production approach to consumer behavior.16 In this case, individuals are assumed 
hold preferences over a bundle of commodities ( )1, , Mz z=z … . These commodities are in turn 
produced by combining the market commodities (x) and the public good (q) through the 
household production process ( ), , 0t q =z x . If the production technology follows the simpler 
structure with ( ),q=z z x , then consumer preferences take the form 
 ( ),u u q =  z x . (42) 
As Freeman (1993, p. 149) notes, weak complementarity in this context corresponds to the 
assumption that x is an essential input to the production of the jz ’s. However, this need not be 
the case. Indeed, if x is not an essential input and q is, then weak complementarity does not hold 
and there is more to RC  than the “use” value associated with the ix ’s. Under this interpretation, 
there is an intrinsic value to the public good not captured by its association with the market. 
Thus, even when x is not consumed, changes to the public good alter consumer welfare.17 
What distinguishes this from the previous case is that there are no omitted variables or other 
misspecifications in the empirical model. Thus, the model the analyst is estimating is in fact the 
true model. Consequently, the welfare measure RC  derived from equation (6) is fully revealable 
in this case. 
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Specification Errors as the Source of Empirical Violations 
We complete this section by noting one additional explanation for violations of weak 
complementarity. The previous two explanations have been based on behavioral underpinnings. 
An alternative explanation may lie with econometric problems. As Randall (1994) has pointed 
out, prices in RP models are likely measured with error, as are other variables entering the model 
that depend on an individual’s recall while responding to a survey. Thus, it may in fact be that 
weak complementarity holds, but we reject this in preference estimation due to data problems. 
Specifically in the case of the LES model, if trip data (i.e., the ix ’s) are systematically under- or 
overstated due to recall errors, these errors are likely to be captured by the estimated iθ ’s in 
equation (26), which are in turn used to test for violations of weak complementarity. 
Alternatively, it may be that the utility function we estimate is incorrect or not sufficiently 
flexible and we reject weak complementarity although it would hold for the individual’s true 
preference function. 
Although these explanations may of course be true and undoubtedly contribute somewhat to 
deviations from weak complementarity, they could in fact be said about any empirical welfare 
measurement, regardless of whether it is related strictly to use, existence, or some form of 
indirect use. Hypothesis tests and imputed welfare measures are always conditional upon the 
underlying model specification. This suggests that caution is appropriate when violations of 
weak complementarity are found in an LES model and that further research is needed into the 
use of more flexible functional forms within the KT framework. However, while acknowledging 
the potential for misspecification errors, we believe that this explanation begs the question of the 
proper course of action when the chosen specification is not consistent with weak 
complementarity. The LES model may indeed be an accurate representation of preferences and 
the available data may indeed be accurate. The question in this case is how should the analyst 
proceed. In the following section we investigate the various welfare measures discussed above, 
conditional on any data and/or specification problems that may be present. 
 
5. Empirical Investigation 
Our empirical investigation centers around data obtained from the 1997 Iowa Wetlands 
Survey conducted at Iowa State University. The purpose of this survey was to obtain information 
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on Iowans’ use of wetlands in the state as well as attitudes towards wetlands preservation and 
conservation. A survey of 6,000 Iowa households was drawn from the general population and 
from state hunting and fishing license holders, from which 3,131 useable surveys were returned. 
As part of the survey each individual was given a map of the state, divided into fifteen zones, and 
asked to record the number of visits to wetlands made to each of the zones during 1997. 
Of particular interest for this example are the responses of individuals living in the north-
central part of the state encompassing three of the zones. This area is known as the Des Moines 
lobe of the North American prairie pothole region. The prairie pothole region is a large, fairly 
unique section of the continent, including parts of Iowa, Minnesota, the Dakotas, and the 
Canadian plains provinces. The area is dotted with indentations (formed by retreating glaciers) in 
otherwise flat landscapes, which are wet for at least part of the year. This type of wetland is ideal 
habitat for many types of wildlife, including ducks and pheasants, and is important at both the 
local and continental level. At the local level, these wetlands and the surrounding upland areas 
provide opportunities for outdoor recreation, including hunting, hiking, and wildlife viewing. In 
this application we model visits to the three prairie pothole zones by individuals living in the 
region. This subsample includes 296 respondents, of whom 191 visited a wetland in the region 
during 1997. Of these individuals, only eleven visited wetlands in each of the three zones 
comprising the prairie pothole region. The KT model as discussed in section 3 is an attractive 
model for this application, because it readily accounts for nonparticipation and corner solutions 
in the data. 
Prices of visits to the three sites included in the model were calculated in the typical manner, 
using round-trip travel distance and time as computed via the software package PCMiler and 
valuing travel and money costs at $0.21/mile and one-third the wage rate, respectively. Quality 
variables enter the model in the form of county-level roadside pheasant counts provided by the 
Iowa Department of Natural Resources, aggregated to correspond to the three zones included in 
the survey instrument. For estimation purposes, an effective pheasant count variable is 
constructed by weighting actual pheasant counts by a dummy variable equal to one if the survey 
respondent indicated possession of a hunting or fishing license. It is further assumed that the 
random terms are distributed independent, identical extreme value. While more general 
distributions are possible (see Phaneuf et al. 2000), this specification provides a closed form for 
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the likelihood function and allows direct resampling from the estimated error distribution, 
significantly simplifying the estimation and welfare calculation process.18 Given these 
assumptions, we estimate the three-site KT model using the prairie pothole subsample from the 
Iowa Wetlands data, with results of estimation presented in Table 1. 
 
 Table 1: Estimation and welfare results 
Parameters Model 
 Unrestricted Restricted Logit 
1θ  7.15 
(0.83)  
NA NA 
2θ  6.72 
(0.79) 
NA NA 
3θ  8.44 
(1.00) 
NA NA 
0δ  -5.78 
(0.16) 
-8.91 
(0.25) 
NA 
1δ  0.0103 
(0.0021) 
0.024 
(0.0049) 
NA 
v  0.5839 
(0.033) 
1.36 
(0.074) 
NA 
0β  NA NA 1.69 
(0.07) 
yβ  NA NA 0.05 
(0.001) 
pβ  NA NA 0.023 
(0.001) 
Log-likelihood -1241 -1354 -7202 
Welfare Scenario CR CU CR CR 
20 percent increase in 
pheasant counts at all site 
$322 
(83) 
$88 
(33) 
$778 
(166) 
$36 
(11) 
 Note: Standard errors on welfare measures computed via 200 bootstrap replications. 
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We estimate two specifications of the KT model, an unrestricted and a restricted version. 
The unrestricted model freely estimates jθ  for each site whereas the restricted model restricts 
each of these parameters to equal to one, imposing weak complementarity on the preference 
structure. Both models are parsimonious in parameters, and in each case all estimates are 
significantly different from zero at better than the 1 percent confidence level. As expected, 
increases in pheasant counts at each site will increase utility and positively affect the demand for 
trips. These parameters characterize preferences, which can then be used to calculate elasticities 
and other measures of policy interest. 
Of particular interest for the topic of this paper are the estimates of jθ . Note that in each 
case the estimates are significantly different from one at any reasonable confidence level, and 
that the restricted model is rejected against the unrestricted model in a likelihood ratio test at the 
1 percent significance level. Thus, for this specification of utility in this application, weak 
complementarity is rejected. Welfare calculations corresponding to equation (24) above will 
contain not only pure use value, but also indirect use. Therefore the analyst must determine 
which is the correct measure to report. For this example, we consider the effects of a 20 percent 
increase in pheasant counts throughout the prairie pothole region and calculate three KT welfare 
measures, along with the comparable repeated multinomial logit welfare measure. Each of these 
could be considered correct under various assumptions.  
If we adopt the interpretation of the omitted variables story—that weak complementarity is 
rejected because the model does not explicitly model the demand for goods that also are in the 
weakly complementary set of goods—then it will be most correct to calculate and report UC . 
The degree to which our estimate of UC is biased will depend, as indicated earlier, on the degree 
of correlation between the prices, the functional form of demand, and the magnitude of the cross 
price effect. Although the magnitude of the bias is clearly an empirical question that will vary 
across applications, we suspect that in most cases it will be small enough not to be a significant 
cause of concern. Thus, the omitted variables interpretation would suggest that the analyst report 
a use value of about $88 per season for a 20 percent increase in the pheasant population. It is 
useful to once again note that this value does not consider the change in values of the weakly 
complementary goods that are not included in the model. 
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In contrast, if we believe the model is correctly specified and the rejection of weak 
complementarity is evidence of the essential nature of q, then it would seem most correct to 
calculate and report the full value of RC , including both the pure use value and the residual 
indirect use value. Thus, the analyst would report that a 20 percent increase in the pheasant 
population would yield about $322 of surplus. The analyst might further break this value down 
into the two components of use (about $88) and nonuse (about $234), but it is not clear that there 
is any intrinsic value to this division. 
If instead the analyst believes that model misspecification or measurement errors yield 
biased measures of IUC , it is unclear how one should proceed. A case could likely be made for 
imposing weak complementarity as a maintained hypothesis, yielding $778 in this instance, or 
using the unrestricted model’s estimate of $88UC = . A final option, which may be preferable 
given one’s belief that weak complementarity ought to hold but is rejected due to 
misspecification, would be to apply Larson’s (1991) method for imposing weak complementarity 
on preferences. Further research would be necessary to generalize this for the case of corner 
solutions, but it is likely feasible nonetheless. 
In either of the previous three cases, it will be important for the analyst to clearly identify 
which welfare measure has been calculated and reported. It is apparent from the large differences 
in the magnitudes of the welfare measures that this decision has potentially large implications for 
the outcome of benefit cost comparisons and other uses of welfare numbers. 
For comparison purposes, we also estimate a standard four-good repeated multinomial logit 
model. The repeated multinomial logit model conditional indirect utility functions are given by 
( ) , 1,...,3,j y j p j jV y p ph jβ β ε= − + + =  and 0 0 0yV yβ β ε= + +  for the option of not making a trip. 
Fifty choice occasions were used and income (y) was calculated as annual income divided by the 
number of choice occasions. This model is of particular interest in the context of our discussion 
since it, like the restricted KT model, imposes weak complementarity ex ante. Interestingly, the 
welfare result from the logit model of $36 for R UC C=  (see Table 1) is of a comparable order of 
magnitude to the use value from the unrestricted KT model. In contrast, the use value obtained 
from the ex ante restricted KT model is $778. This could be interpreted as providing some 
anecdotal support for estimating unrestricted preferences in KT models, rather than ex ante 
imposing weak complementarity. 
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6. Final Remarks 
In this paper, we investigate the implications of non-weakly complementary preferences for 
applied welfare analysis using RP data. Although existence value cannot be measured using RP data, 
there is a component of total value outside of standard use value (deemed “indirect use” value here) for 
which RP approaches may be able to shed some light. The purpose of this paper has been to highlight 
this issue and begin to investigate its implications for welfare measurement. Our motivation is 
pragmatic, in that the recently available KT model does not a priori impose weak complementarity, 
requiring the analyst to determine which is the correct welfare measure to report. Critical to 
understanding welfare measurement when weak complementarity does not hold is to first understand 
and define the relevant components of total value. We do so with a particular focus on identifying the 
components of total value that are recoverable, at least potentially, from RP data and models. 
We propose three explanations for why weak complementarity may be violated in any particular 
empirical setting: weak complementarity with sets of goods, a household production model with 
quality as an essential input, and econometric problems. We note that the implications for welfare 
analysis are quite different in each of the cases and that the proper welfare measure will depend on the 
judgment of the analyst. In laying out these three interpretations, we do not intend to promote one over 
any other; rather we seek to provide a framework for discussion, interpretation, and future research. 
However, we do note that those inherently uneasy about anything beyond direct use value in RP 
models will likely be most comfortable with the first or third interpretation and the associated welfare 
measures. 
The KT model is a convenient framework for investigating these issues empirically as weak 
complementarity does not have to be imposed ex ante, but rather can be tested for in the context of the 
model. In contrast, the standard RUM model implicitly imposes weak complementarity and, in doing 
so, precludes investigation into the consequences of the restriction. An application of the KT model to 
wetlands usage in the prairie pothole region of Iowa suggests, in fact, that weak complementarity does 
not hold in the empirical specification between visits to wetlands and pheasant populations. Further, the 
alternative interpretations of why weak complementarity does not hold yield welfare magnitudes of 
sufficient difference to warrant further investigation into these issues. Steps in this direction may 
include estimating KT models using more general functional forms for utility and/or the error 
distribution. 

  
 
 
 
 
7. Endnotes 
 
1. This is a generalization of Freeman’s [1993, pp. 123-24] “hopeless” case in which he assumes that q enters 
only as a strongly separable component of utility. 
2. It is assumed that ( ),T u q  is strictly increasing in u. 
3. A proof of this is provided in the Appendix. 
4. Obviously, one could reverse the order of compensation by defining RC!  such that: 
( ) ( )0 0 1 0 1 1, , , , , ,RT v q y q T v q y C q   = −   p p !! ! , 
where y y C≡ − !! . In this case, the decomposition would be T RC C C= +! !  and the counterpart to equation (10) 
would become 
( ) ( )
( )
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1
, , , , , ,
, , , .R
T v q y q T v q y C q
T v q y C C q
   = −   
 = − − 
p p
p
!
! !
 
There are two reasons to prefer the decomposition in equation (8). First, from a practical point of view, because 
the functional form for ( ),T q⋅  can never be identified from RP data, C!  cannot be computed and, 
consequently, neither can y!  or RC! . Second, even if C!  were known, as long as q is a normal good RRC C> ! , so 
that RC  represents the largest portion of total value that can be extracted from behavioral data. 
5. The compensation EC  is similar to the notion of Carson et al. (1999) of “passive-use” value; i.e., “. . . those 
portions of total value . . . that are unobtainable using indirect measurement techniques which rely on observed 
market behavior.” (p. 100). We have chosen not to use the term “passive-use” value, however, to avoid 
confusion with the notion of indirect use (e.g., reading magazines, etc., concerning a recreation site) that is 
included in RC . 
6. See LaFrance (1992) for additional discussion regarding testing of the weak complementarity restriction. 
7. In Freeman’s (1993) terms IUC  could also be referred to as “nonuse” value. We avoid this terminology here 
to prevent confusion, because in other works “nonuse” value and “existence” value have been used 
synonymously. As previously noted, in this case EC  and IUC  have quite different interpretations. 
8. In fact, as Hanemann (1988, p. 1) notes, decompositions analogous to equations (13) and (14) are valid for 
any intermediate prices, although the terminologies of use or nonuse values would be less intuitive. 
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9. For the time being, we ignore the problem of income effects in the demand equations. 
10. See Phaneuf et al. (2000) for further details on implementing the KT model.  
11. See Phaneuf et al. (2000) for a discussion of the necessary algorithm for computing welfare measures in the KT 
model. This process, while computationally intense, is conceptually simple once the conditional indirect utility 
functions are recovered.  
12. Although in fairness to the KT model it should be noted that most recreation demand studies rely on the 
restrictive linear-in-income form of the RUM model.  
13. The expression in equation (27) represents one way to write the compensating (or equivalent) variation, based on 
the path of integration ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0 01 2 1 2 1 2, , ,p p p q p p q p q→ →! ! ! . Of course, the same welfare compensation would 
result if the alternative path ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0 01 2 1 2 1 2, , ,p p p p q p q p q→ →! ! !  had been used, yielding 1 2T U UC C C= +! . More 
generally, the welfare measure can be expressed as a line integral that is path independent for the Hicksian welfare 
measures. See Bockstael and Kling (1988) for the derivation and discussion. 
14. For the linear model in equation (31), it can be shown that 1bias  is in fact zero on average if: (1) the initial 
price for good 1 (i.e., 01p ) is the same across all households, (2) the initial price of good 2 (
0
2p ) is symmetrically 
distributed about the population mean ( 02p ), and (3) all households are users (i.e., 1 0x > ) before (after) a quality 
increase (decrease). If condition (3) is violated, 1bias  will on average be negative (positive) for a quality 
increase (decrease). 
15. Ideally, the analyst knows that the second good exists and will be able to realistically impose sufficient 
structure on preferences to allow all of the parameters of the expenditure function to be recovered through the 
estimated demand function for good 1 (e.g., in an LES system). The resulting Rbias  would then be limited if 
0
2p  varied little, if at all, in the population. 
16. See, for example, Becker (1965), Lancaster (1966), and Bockstael and McConnell (1993). 
17. While difficult to quantify, one can tell stories consistent with these types of preferences. For example, if an 
individual is unable to go fishing with his friends because of other commitments but later enjoys hearing stories 
about how great the fishing was, he is producing utility from the environmental good without consuming the 
complement. Thus, weak complementarity does not hold in the structure of the individual’s preferences for the 
single good.  
18. Additional details on estimation and welfare calculation can be found in Phaneuf and Herriges (1999) 
or Phaneuf et al. (2000). Example GAUSS programs for estimation and welfare measures for the LES/EV 
model are available from the authors upon request.  
 
  
 
 
 
8. Appendix 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate that the welfare decomposition in equation (5) and 
originally proposed by Hanemann (1988) holds only if the marginal utility of income is constant. To see 
this, note that, from equation (6), RC  can be equivalently defined as implicitly solving the equality  
 ( ) ( )0 0 0 1, , , , Rv q y v q y C= −p p . (43) 
However, equations (4) and (7) imply that: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
0 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1
, , , , , ,
, , , ,
T
R
T v q y q T v q y C q
T v q y C q
   = −   
 = − 
p p
p
!
!
 (44) 
where y y C≡ − !! . This in turn implies that 
 ( ) ( )0 0 0 1, , , , .Rv q y v q y C= −p p! !  (45) 
Clearly, equations (43) and (45) will generally hold only if the marginal utility of income is constant. 
 
 

  
 
 
9. References 
Becker, G. S. 1965. “A Theory of the Allocation of Time.” Economic Journal 75: 493-517. 
 
Bockstael, N. E., and C. L. Kling. 1988. “Valuing Environmental Quality: Weak 
Complementarity with Sets of Goods.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics  
 70: 654-62. 
 
Bockstael, N. E., and K. E. McConnell. 1983. “Welfare Measurement in the Household 
Production Framework.” American Economic Review 73: 806-14. 
 
_______________. 1993. “Public Goods as Characteristics of Non-market Commodities.” 
Economics Journal 103: 1244-57. 
 
Carson, R. T., N. E. Flores, and R. C. Mitchell. 1999. “The Theory and Measurement of Passive-
Use Value.” In Valuing Environmental Preferences: Theory and Practice of the Contingent 
Valuation Method in the U.S., E.U., and Developing Countries, I. J. Bateman and K. G. 
Willis, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Freeman, A. M. 1993. The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values: Theory and 
Methods. Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C. 
 
Green, R., and Z. A. Hassan. 1980. “Choices and Consequences: Comment,” American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 62: 174-75.  
 
Hanemann, W. M. 1988. “Three Approaches to Defining ‘Existence’ or ‘Non-use’ Value under 
Certainty.” Unpublished paper, University of California, Berkeley. 
 
Hausman, J. A. 1981. “Exact Consumer’s Surplus and Dead Weight Loss.” American Economic 
Review 71: 662-76.  
 
King, R. A. 199. “Choices and Consequences.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics  
 61: 839-48. 
 
LaFrance, J. 1992. “Incomplete Demand Systems, Weak Separability, and Weak 
Complementarity.” Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Working Paper 
#77, University of Arizona, Tucson. 
 
Lancaster, K. J. 1966. “A New Approach to Consumer Theory,” Journal of Political Economy, 
74: 132-57. 
32  /  Herriges, Kling, and Phaneuf 
 
Larson, D. M. 1991. “Recovering Weakly Complementary Preferences,” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 21: 97-108. 
 
Madariaga, B., and K. E. McConnell. 1987. “Exploring Existence Value.” Water Resources 
Research 23: 936-42. 
 
Mäler, K. G. 1974. Environmental Economics: A Theoretical Inquiry. Baltimore MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future. 
 
McConnell, K. E. 1983. “Existence and Bequest Value.” In Managing Air Quality and Scenic 
Resources at National Parks and Wilderness Areas, R. D. Rowe and L. G. Chestnut, eds. 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
 
Phaneuf, D. J., and J. A. Herriges. 1999. “Choice Set Definition in a Kuhn-Tucker Model of 
Recreation Demand.” Marine Resources Economics 14: 343-55. 
 
Phaneuf, D. J., C. L. Kling, and J. A. Herriges. 2000. “Estimation and Welfare Calculations in a 
Generalized Corner Solution Model with an Application to Recreation Demand.” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 82: 83-92. 
 
Pollak, R. A. and T. J. Wales. 1992. Demand System Specification and Estimation. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Randall, A. 1994. “A Difficulty with the Travel Cost Model.” Land Economics 70: 88-96. 
 
Wales, T. J., and A. D. Woodland. 1983. “Estimation of Consumer Demand Systems with 
Binding Nonnegativity Constraints.” Journal of Econometrics, 21: 263-85. 
 
